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Abstract 
 We empirically test the effects of unanticipated fiscal policy shocks on the growth 
rate and the cyclical component of real private output and reveal different types of 
asymmetries in fiscal policy implementation. The data used are quarterly U.S. observations 
over the period 1967:1 to 2011:4. In doing so, we use both a vector autoregressive and the 
novel support vector machines systems in order to extract the fiscal policy shocks series. The 
latter has never been used before in a similar macroeconomic setting. Within our research 
framework, in order to test the robustness of our results to alternative aggregate money supply 
definitions we use two alternative moentary aggregates. These are the commonly reported by 
central banks and policy makers simple sum monetary aggregates at the MZM level of 
aggregation and the alternative CFS Divisia MZM aggregate. From each of these four 
systems we extracted four types of shocks: a negative and a positive government spending 
shock and a negative and a positive government revenue shock. These eight different types of 
unanticipated fiscal policy shocks are next used to empirically examine their effects on the 
growth rate and the cyclical component of real private GNP in two sets of regressions: one 
that assumes only contemporaneous effects of the shocks on output and one that is augmented 
with four lags of each fiscal shock. 
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1. Introduction 
In this paper we empirically test the existence of non-linearities that may be associated 
with the conduct of fiscal policy.  In doing so, we try to detect two types of fiscal policy 
asymmetries: first, whether equal in magnitude contractionary or expansionary fiscal shocks 
have the same multiplier impact on real output, and second whether theoretically equal –in 
terms of their impact on the government budget fiscal policy tools, such as a tax cut or an 
increase in government spending, have the same impact on output. 
Fiscal and monetary policies are the cornerstone of policymaking.  However, until 2000 the 
main bulk of empirical research was dedicated solely to the effects of monetary policy. In the 
aftermath of the global crisis of 2008 there is a growing debate of whether governments 
should run fiscal stimulus packages in order to restore previous growth rates or run an 
austerity program to reduce deficits and in the long-run debt as a percent of GDP. Recently 
for example, highly indebted Eurozone countries (Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain) are 
required to implement fiscal austerity measures in order to balance their balance sheets. In 
this context it is interesting to see whether and how Keynesian principles may apply.  
According to (Bertola and Drazen, 1993), governments should choose fiscal stimulus 
packages if they accept a positive and above unity fiscal multiplier regardless of the debt to 
GDP ratio.  Keynesian economics assert that government spending and tax cuts, directly 
affect disposable private income and through the channel of active demand the economy 
tracks itself back to a growth path. The fiscal multiplier under Keynesian beliefs is well above 
unity as there is no crowding out effect and the wealth effect is not so strong. Due to various 
rigidities in the markets (labor, goods and services), this fiscal stimulus during recessions and  
fiscal contraction during boom times accordingly, is necessary and appropriate in order to 
restore equilibrium. Although, the exact value of the multiplier depends on various other 
factors, such as the simultaneous usage of monetary policy, the openness of the economy, the 
exchange rate regime e.t.c.  its sign, however, is not under question: we expect a positive 
impact on GDP from an increase in government spending. 
The neoclassical school on the other hand, asserts that government spending or tax cuts have 
no impact on GDP due to the Ricardian equivalence (Barro 1974). Agents fully anticipate the 
debt burden of the fiscal stimulus, expecting higher taxes in the future (wealth effect). Thus, 
in order to smooth out their level of consumption they save more as their disposable income 
increases leaving private consumption unchanged.. There is a crowding out effect of the 
private sector that fully offsets the increase of the demand from the public sector which 
renders the fiscal multiplier to zero. This is more apparent in periods of growth, since then the 
probability of a more efficient usage of resources from the government is lower than it is 
during a recession. On the other hand, there is room for a low positive multiplier during 
recessions, since resources are underused. 
There is also a new class of research pointing to an exactly different direction than that of 
Keynesian economics: these find that the multiplier of fiscal contraction is positive and vice 
versa. This is known as contractionary fiscal expansion effect or expansionary fiscal 
contraction due mostly to a wealth effect that is, consumers put more weight to future 
consumption than to current one.  At this notion, Alesina and Perotti (1997) and Giavazzi and 
Pagano (1990) among others, state that fiscal contraction based on expenditure cuts may be 
expansionary if it is accompanied by currency devaluation or by agreements with the unions. 
The greater this adjustment is the more is being anticipated by the agents leading to more 
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powerful results.  Furthermore, a tax increase in order to accommodate a deficit has the exact 
opposite results than a decrease of government spending because it reduces the 
competitiveness of the economy. This view is enhanced by Blanchard (1990), who states that 
fiscal consolidation may reduce uncertainty for the future leading to an increase in 
household’s wealth today. This can be achieved through the decrease of interest rates as a 
result of the reduction of the risk premium of government bonds (Alesina and Ardagna, 
2009). 
In their seminal paper, Bertola and Drazen (1993), postulate that the sign of the fiscal 
multiplier depends on the GDP to debt ratio. In a hypothetical economy, where all agents are 
rational, and GDP to debt ratio is low, an increase of the government spending will be neutral 
to the real economy, featuring a Ricardian or even a negative effect. If the GDP to debt ratio 
is relatively large a fiscal consolidation signals a trial of the government to stabilize the 
economy and thus lifting future uncertainty leading to a positive multiplier or to an anti – 
Keynesian effect. 
According to the above, the fiscal multiplier for an increase in government expenditures can 
range between negative and positive values and be large or small. According to the above, we 
can identify five potential sources of non – linearities/asymmetries of fiscal policy: a) the 
phase of the business cycle, b) the GDP to debt ratio, c) the sign of the shock (positive versus 
negative shocks of the same instrument), d) the nature of the shock (spending versus 
revenues), e) the magnitude of the shock. 
In this paper, we try to estimate the value of the fiscal multiplier taking into account the sign 
and the nature of the shock. Using VAR analysis with identified structural errors, Machine 
Learning  (ML) techniques,  a new dataset for the U.S. economy and running various tests, we 
come along some very interesting results. We cannot reject asymmetries in government 
spending between a positive unanticipated government spending shock and a negative such 
shock. The same asymmetries are detected for the unanticipated government revenue shocks. 
We also detect asymmetries in expansionary and contractionary unexpected fiscal policies.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the empirical literature 
review, Section 3 provides a detailed description of the data and the methodology used. The 
main results are presented in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Literature Review 
Despite this divergence of opinions, the empirical research is too narrow and is divided 
between linear and nonlinear policy analysis. Linear analysis covers most of the research, 
while nonlinear analysis is being implemented only in recent years. Empirical research 
focused into fiscal policy in the last decade following mostly the seminal work of Blanchard 
and Perotti (2002) in a VAR analysis which was built upon the innovative work of Sims 
(1980) in VAR analysis. Blanchard and Perotti (2002) introduced a new method of 
identification of structural errors using institutional information on tax and transfer system 
and under the main assumption, among others, that fiscal policy is a rather long process using 
quarterly data introduce their restrictions and identify structural fiscal shocks that are 
exogenous to the rest of the VAR variables. They conclude that, the U.S. economy 
experiences Keynesian effects regarding the sign of fiscal multipliers as well as there are 
asymmetries between tax and government purchases multipliers but not asymmetries of the 
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effects on the output of a positive versus a negative change in taxes. Tagkalakis (2008) using 
an unbalanced yearly panel data set (1970-2002) of nineteen OECD countries, confirmed that 
in the presence of binding liquidity constraints during recessions both positive government 
spending and negative tax shocks have stronger stimulus effects on private consumption than 
in expansions. In a different analytical framework Leeper et al. (2010) show that government 
investment is contractionary in the short run, at worst, and has a muted impact, at best. This is 
mainly due to substantial time to build lags. The results over the long run are conditional upon 
the productivity of the public capital. Pereira and Lopes (2010) examining U.S. quarterly data 
over the 1965:2 to 2009:2 period in a Blanchard-Perron identification mode into a Bayesian 
simulation procedure, they find that policy effectiveness has come down substantially. More 
specifically, this trend is more evident for taxes net of transfers than for government 
expenditures, although, fiscal multipliers keep Keynesian signs. Cogan et al. (2009), focusing 
on an empirically estimated macroeconomic model for the U.S., find that the government 
spending multipliers are much less in new Keynesian that in old Keynesian models. The 
multipliers are less than one as consumption and investment are crowded out. On the other 
hand, Romer and Romer (2010), using new sources of data such as presidential speeches, 
executive-branch documents and Congressional reports, identify the size, timing and principal 
motivation for all major post-war tax policy actions. Their main findings indicate a very large 
effect of tax changes on output and on investments. This multiplier is well above unity, being 
in stark contrast with the findings of previous empirical researches. Barro and Redlick (2009), 
estimate a multiplier regarding responses of U.S. GDP to changes in defence spending 
between 0.6-0.7.  As they point out in their paper, the exact volume of the multiplier is subject 
to economic slack, reaching unity as unemployment rate is quite high, around 12%. Positive 
tax rate shocks have significantly negative effects on real GDP growth. Mountford and Uhlig 
(2009), incorporating a VAR analysis and using new restrictions to identify revenue and 
spending shocks, as well as taking into account business cycle and monetary shocks, conclude 
that deficit financed tax cuts are the best fiscal policy to improve GDP, finding a very large 
multiplier. Gali et al. (2007), show that in an economy in which for some households (named 
rule of thumb consumers) consumption equals labor income and there exist sticky prices, it is 
possible that government spending shocks positively affect consumption. In this way, wealth 
effects are totally overshadowed by the sensitivity to current disposable income. Aggregate 
demand is partly insulated from the negative wealth effect generated by the higher levels of 
taxes needed to finance the fiscal expansion. 
In a non-linear framework, Baum and Koester (2011), using a threshold VAR model, analyse 
the effects of fiscal policy on economic activity over the business cycle for Germany. They 
derive a fiscal multiplier around 0.7 for both revenues and spending in a linear model. When 
they take into account the phase of the business cycle, they find a spending multiplier around 
unity in boom times and 0.36 in recessions. There are also non linearities regarding the sign 
of government intervention through spending. With respect to revenue shocks they find less 
diverging results for both the phase of the business cycle and the type of fiscal policy 
implemented (expansionary or contractionary). 
As it is clear from the above, empirical research spans a wide range of tests, including linear 
and non–linear models concerning the phase of the business cycle, the financial constraint of 
the agents, the nature and the sign of the fiscal intervention. Most of these studies, converge 
to fiscal multiplies below unity with the spending multiplier being of greater importance than 
the tax multiplier. In what follows we try to unfold the impact of fiscal policy using quarterly 
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data for the U.S. economy for government spending, total government revenue, GNP (growth 
rate and cyclical component) and monetary variables such as the Treasury bill rate and the 
money supply.  In this study we introduce four main innovations: first, to the best of our 
knowledge the Divisia monetary aggregates have not yet been used to previous research 
pertaining to fiscal policy. Second, following Cover’s (1992) procedure of identifying 
monetary policy shocks we extract the unanticipated fiscal policy shocks on government 
spending and revenue. Moreover, we introduce Support Vector Regression models which 
have never been used before in this research area, but the empirical results of other 
implementations such as exchange rate (Papadimitriou et al, 2013), bank insolvency 
(Papadimitriou et al, 2013) and GDP forecasting (Gogas et al, 2013) imply high 
generalization abilities with non-linear and non-stationary datasets.  Finally, we explicitly test 
for the asymmetric effects on the growth rate and the cyclical component of real private GNP 
of a contractionary and expansionary fiscal policy. We come up with three key findings; first, 
all fiscal multipliers are below unity but with signs as predicted by Keynesian theory. Second, 
government expenditures have a larger impact as compared to the tax policy and finally, 
positive government spending shocks are more significant than negative spending shocks. All 
these results are in line with previous studies and are robust through many tests using 
structural identification proposed by Blanchard and Perotti (2002). 
3. The Data 
In this study we use quarterly data that span the period 1967Q1 to 2011Q4. The range 
of the data sample is limited by the availability of the monetary aggregates. The data are taken 
from the St. Louis Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED) service. These include the real 
private Gross National Product, government consumption expenditures and gross investment, 
government current receipts and the 3-month Treasury bill rate
1
. All initial data are in current 
values and they are transformed –with the exception of the Treasury-bill rate- to real series by 
using the implicit price deflator of the GNP with 2005 as the base year. The two monetary 
aggregates used in this study are the official simple-sum aggregates in the MZM level of 
aggregation as they are reported by the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis and the Divisia 
MZM aggregates both in real terms. The Divisia monetary aggregate series are from the new 
Divisia monetary aggregates maintained within the Center of Financial Stability (CFS) 
program Advances in Monetary and Financial Measurement (AMFM), called CFS Divisia 
aggregates and documented in Barnett et al. (2013). We use both types of monetary 
aggregates in an effort to see whether our results are affected by the so-called “Barnett 
critique”. In this regard, Barnett (1980) argues that official simple-sum monetary aggregates, 
constructed by the Federal Reserve, produce an internal inconsistency between the implicit 
aggregation theory and the theory relevant to the models and policy within which the 
resulting data are nested and used. That incoherence has been called the Barnett Critique [see, 
for example, Chrystal and MacDonald (1994) and Belongia and Ireland (2013)], with 
emphasis on the resulting inference and policy errors and the induced appearances of function 
instability. Finally, all data with the exception of the Treasury-bill rate are transformed to 
natural logarithms. To test the integration properties if our data we perform three different 
                                                             
1 The relevant FRED codes are GNPC96, GCEC, GRECPT and TB3MS respectively. 
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unit root tests: a) an augmented Dickey-Fuller test, b) a KPSS test where the null hypothesis 
is stationarity and finally c) an Elliott-Rothenberg-Stock test. In Table 1 we present the results 
of these unit root tests and we conclude that all variables used in this study are I(1). Thus for 
the rest of the empirical section we use the first differences of the variables unless otherwise 
stated. 
4. Empirical Model and Identification 
Since we determined in the previous section that all our variables are I(1) we proceed 
by testing our variables for a commons stochastic trend. Table 3, reports the results of the 
Johansen maximum likelihood cointegration tests on a VAR with lag length p = 3. We also 
report tail areas of residual misspecification tests. Two test statistics are used to test for the 
number of cointegrating vectors, the trace (      ) and maximum eigenvalue (    ) test 
statistics. In the trace test the null hypothesis that there are at most r cointegrating vectors is 
tested against a general alternative. In the case of the maximum eigenvalue test the alternative 
is explicitly stated. Using 99% critical values for the two tests we that the        and      
test statistics provide evidence of one cointegrating relation in both VAR models we test: one 
with the simple sum MZM as the exogenous monetary aggregate and the other with the CFS 
Divisia instead. Since we detected one cointegrating vector, we proceed in our analysis by 
using a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM) including the lagged error correction term in 
the VARs regressors. 
 As it was previously mentioned, we use a structural VAR model with two alternative 
sets of exogenous variables. We perform a Blanchard-Perotti (2002) identification procedure 
to extract the structural errors. The basic reduced form VAR specification in order to identify 
the structural errors is: 
                                                                 ,                                             (1) 
where    is a three dimensional vector of the endogenous variables, government revenue (r), 
government spending (g) and real private Gross National Product (y) and Zt is a vector of the 
two exogenous monetary variables, the 3-month Treasury bill rate (TB3) and the monetary 
aggregate, where we use alternatively a simple-sum and a CFS Divisia in the MZM level of 
aggregation. All variables are in first differences. The exogenous variables vector is two 
dimensional because we use each monetary aggregate separately along with the TB3 variable. 
   represents the three dimensional vector of reduced form residuals with the corresponding 
ordering [rt,gt,yt] and finally A0 is the intercept coefficient vector, A(Lq) is a four lag 
polynomial and B is the exogenous variables coefficients vector. A four quarter lag length is 
chosen as there is a seasonality pattern in the response of taxes to output – see Blanchard-
Perotti (2002).  
4.1 Blanchard-Perotti Identification 
 We employ the Blanchard-Perotti (2002) method of structural identification. As they 
well document in their seminal paper, the innovations in the fiscal variables, taxes and 
revenues are a linear combination of three types of shocks, a) the automatic response of these 
fiscal variables to output (automatic stabilizers), b) the discretionary effects of revenues to 
spending shocks and vice versa, c) the random fiscal shocks which are to be identified. Thus, 
the equation system is: 
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In order to set the appropriate restrictions Blanchard and Perotti further assume that 
the first set of shocks (a1 and b1  for taxes and spending respectively) can be estimated as the 
elasticity of fiscal variables to output shocks as it takes more than a quarter for a fiscal policy 
measure to be decided and be implemented. As a measure for tax elasticity on output, a1, we 
take into consideration Blanchard-Perotti’s calculations who report an average value of 2.  As 
for the spending multiplier, b1, this is set to zero, as the main component of primary 
government spending, unemployment transfers is included in net revenues
2
.  Then, 
contemporaneous effect of fiscal variables to output (c1 and c2) need to be estimated. Again in 
line with Blanchard et al (2002) and Baum et al. (2011), we use the cyclically adjusted 
reduced form fiscal policy shocks and we estimate the third equation of the equation system 
2. Finally, under the assumption that revenue decisions come first, a2 is set to zero. This is so, 
because a2 represents the discretionary response of revenues to spending. 
4.2 Support Vector Regression 
 The Support Vector Regression is a direct extension of the classic Support Vector 
Machine algorithm proposed by Vladimir Vapnik (1992). When it comes to SVR, the basic 
idea is to find a linear function that has at most a predetermined deviation from the actual 
values of the actual dataset. In other words we do not care about the error of each forecast as 
long as it doesn’t violate the threshold, but we will not tolerate a higher deviation.  The 
Support Vector (SV) set which bounds this “error-tolerance band” is located in the dataset 
through a minimization procedure. 
One of the main advantages of the SVR in comparison to other machine learning 
techniques is the ability to identify global minima avoiding local ones, thus reaching an 
optimal solution. This aspect is crucial to the generalization ability of the SVR model in 
producing accurate and reliable forecasts. The model is built in two steps: the training step 
and the testing step. In the training step, the largest part of the dataset is used for the 
estimation of the function (i.e. the detection of the Support Vectors that define the band); in 
the testing step, the generalization ability of the model is evaluated by checking the model’s 
performance in the small subset that was left aside in the first step performing out-of-sample 
forecasting.  
Using mathematical notation and starting from a training dataset 
                                  
                , where for each dataset 
pair,    are observation samples and    is the dependent variable (the target of the regression 
system that we need to approximate). As the scope is to minimize the loss function 
    (
 
 
‖ ‖ ) subject to|     
      |             , we enforce an upper deviation 
threshold and creating an “error-tolerance” band. Expanding this initial framework, Vapnik 
and Cortes (1995) proposed a soft margin model, i.e. accept the existence of vectors outside 
this error tolerance zone that are penalized according to their distance from the zone. So, they 
introduce slack variables to the loss function    and   
  controlled through a cost parameter C, 
                                                             
2 For an extended presentation see Blanchard et al (2002) and Baum et al. (2011).  
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resulting to a loss function    (
 
 
‖ ‖   ∑       
      ). In this way the primal problem 
that we wish to minimize is: 
   
 
 
‖ ‖   ∑      
   ∑        
   
   ∑            
      
 
   
 
   
 
   
 ∑  
 (    
      
     )
 
   
                                                                   
where      
       
  are the Lagrange multipliers from the Lagrangian primal function (2). 
Instead of solving (1) we attack the dual form of the problem, which takes the form:  
   (
 
 
∑       
         (     
 )  
     ∑       
       ∑         
      )      (3) 
Subject to ∑       
         and                                  
The solution of the primal problem (2) is  
  ∑       
    
 
                                                                         
and                                                    ∑       
    
                                                                           
Real life phenomena, are rarely modelled by linear functions accurately. A simple 
way to bypass the problem is by projecting the observed dataset from the initial data space 
into a higher dimensional space were the linear model is appropriate. The “kernel trick” 
follows the projection idea while ensuring minimum computational cost: the dataset is 
mapped in an inner product space, where the projection is performed using only dot products 
(through special “kernel” functions) within the original space, instead of explicitly computing 
the mapping of each data point. The SV methodology coupled with the “kernel trick” is a very 
powerful tool for classification and regression. Non-linear kernel functions has evolved the 
SVR mechanism to a non-linear regression model, able of approximating non-linear 
phenomena. 
Figure 1: Upper and lower threshold on error tolerance indicated with letter ε. The 
boundaries of the error tolerance band are defined by Support Vectors (SVs).  On the right we 
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see the projection form 2 to 3 dimensions space and the projected error tolerance band. 
Forecasted values greater than ε get a penalty ζ according to their distance from the tolerance 
accepted band (source Scholckopf and Smola, 1998). 
The described mapping was performed on four kernels: the linear, the radial basis 
function (RBF), the sigmoid and the polynomial. The mathematical representation of each 
kernel is: 
Linear              
    (6) 
 
RBF            
  ‖     ‖
 
 (7) 
 
Polynomial           (   
     )
 
 (8) 
 
Sigmoid(MLP)               (   
     ) (9) 
 
with factors d, r, γ representing kernel parameters. 
Again the procedure was repeated with SVR and we extract both fiscal policy 
structural errors: from government revenue and the government spending vector. Two sets of 
such errors are used: the ones from the simple sum MZM monetary aggregate as an 
exogenous variable VAR and the ones from the VAR with the Divisia MZM as an exogenous 
variable. 
5. The Empirical results 
 Following Cover (1992), from each of the above two systems (MZM and CFS) we 
extract the residual series from the equations of government revenue (r) and government 
spending (g). These represent the unanticipated fiscal policy shocks. The series of the 
negative government spending shocks equals the government spending shock if the latter is 
negative otherwise it is equal to zero. The series of the positive government spending shocks 
equals the government spending shock if this is positive and otherwise it is equal to zero. In 
the same manner we construct the negative and positive government revenue shocks. 
Formally: 
        ⁄  |    |        
       ⁄  |    |         
where      is the government spending shock extracted as described above. In a similar 
manner we construct the negative and positive government revenue shocks      and     . 
5.1 Systems with contemporaneous shocks 
 In the previous section we extracted four series of unanticipated fiscal policy shocks, 
from each one of the two VARs considered in this study as well as for the support vector 
regression model. For each VAR these are the negative and positive government spending 
shocks and the negative and positive government revenue shocks series:      ,     ,      
and      respectively. In order to investigate the possible existence of fiscal asymmetries, 
following Cover (1992), we run the following regression with each of the two sets of 
unanticipated fiscal policy shocks: 
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         ∑          
 
                                          
         ,        (11) 
where       is the first difference of the real private GNP at period t,         are two lags of 
the output first differences,     ,     ,      and      are the extracted unanticipated fiscal 
shocks to the economy as discussed above and   ,   ,  ,  , and    are parameters to be 
estimated. In these systems we assume that only current fiscal policy shocks affect the real 
output growth level and thus we include no lagged values of the fiscal shocks. We also 
estimate equation (11) with the cyclical component of the real private GNP as the dependent 
variable. The cyclical component of real private GNP is extracted using a standard Hodrick-
Prescott filter with       . The empirical results are presented in Table 4. Systems 1 and 3 
present the results of the estimation of equation (11) with the fiscal policy shocks identified 
from the VAR including the simple sum MZM monetary aggregate and Divisia MZM 
monetary aggregate respectively. System 5 includes the estimates of equation (11) when the 
dependent variable is the cyclical component of real private GNP and the fiscal policy shocks 
are identified from a VAR with the Divisia MZM as the monetary aggregate variable3. In 
system ML we present the results of the estimation of equation (11) with the fiscal policy 
shocks identified from the support vector regression model.  
The estimated coefficients and the reported p-values of the fiscal policy shocks 
provide evidence on the significance and magnitude of the multipliers of the various fiscal 
shocks on the growth rate of real private GNP and its cyclical component. Moreover, at the 
lower part of Table 4 we report the tail areas of the F-tests performed in testing for fiscal 
policy asymmetries. First, we test the null hypothesis that the multiplier of a positive 
government spending shock is equal to the multiplier of a negative government spending 
shock (        ) or in other words that a contractionary government spending shock has a 
symmetric effect on output as an equal expansionary government spending shock. Second, in 
a similar manner, we test for symmetric effects of the contractionary and expansionary 
government revenue shocks (        ). Next, we try to investigate whether equivalent in 
terms of their impact on government deficit fiscal policies have symmetric effects on the level 
and growth rate of real GNP. First, we test policies that increase the deficit, positive 
government spending and negative government revenue shocks (        ) and finally 
shocks that lead to fiscal consolidation, a decrease in government spending and an increase in 
government revenue shock (        ). 
 According to Table 4 we have some interesting results. First, all coefficients have the 
signs expected by theory in all systems except for the system ML. The coefficients of positive 
government spending shocks (SGP) have positive signs as they are expected to increase real 
private GNP. The same sign is expected on the coefficients of the negative government 
spending shocks (SGN): a negative shock multiplied by a positive coefficient produces a 
decrease in real private GNP. For analogous reasons the estimated coefficients on 
unanticipated revenue shocks have negative signs: an unexpected increase in government 
revenue (SRP) is expected to reduce real private GNP and an unexpected decrease in 
government revenue (SRN) will increase real private GNP. 
                                                             
3
 The relevant estimates with identified fiscal policy shocks from the VAR with the simple sum MZM 
monetary aggregate as the exogenous variable are not included here as they are qualitatively exactly 
the same as the ones of system 5. They are available of course from the authors upon request. 
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We detect some asymmetries across all three systems with respect to fiscal policy 
shocks. It appears that in the System 1 and 2 where the dependent variable is the growth rate 
of real private GNP expansionary and contractionary unanticipated fiscal policies have 
asymmetric effects: the expansionary fiscal policy through either a positive unanticipated 
government spending shock (SGP) or a negative unanticipated government revenue shock 
(SRN) is statistically significant with p-values of 0.008 and 0.052 respectively. On the 
contrary, a contractionary fiscal policy through either a negative unanticipated government 
spending shock (SGN) or a positive unanticipated government revenue shock (SRP) is not 
significant even at the 0.10 significance level. In System 5 where the dependent variable is the 
cyclical component of real private GNP it appears that only a positive unanticipated 
government revenue shock has some impact on the cycle. Both government spending and 
revenue tests show that in general expansionary unanticipated fiscal policy shocks have 
asymmetric effects and appear to affect real private output more than contractionary fiscal 
shocks as the later appear insignificant. Expansionary fiscal policy is significant either 
through spending or revenue. Nonetheless, the coefficient of the positive unanticipated 
government spending shock is more than three times larger than the coefficient of the 
negative unanticipated government revenue shock in Systems 1 and 3 and more than two 
times larger when the dependent variable is the cyclical component of real private GNP. In 
the lower part of Table 4, the F-tests show that this asymmetry is statistically significant only 
for System 1. In system ML the unanticipated fiscal policy shocks does not seem to have any 
statistically significant impact on the level of the real private GNP. 
 
5.2 Systems augmented with lagged shocks 
 In this section we augment the regressions run in equation (11) by assuming that not 
only the current values of the explanatory variables affect the level and growth rate of GDP 
but also four lags that correspond to a year’s worth of historical information. The estimated 
equation now becomes: 
         ∑           
 
    ∑                                              
 
   
                                (12)  
with similar specification as equation (11). The results from running equation (12) are 
presented in Table 5. Systems 2 and 4 have the growth rate of real private GNP as the 
dependent variable with fiscal policy shocks identified from a VAR with simple sum and 
Divisia MZM as the monetary aggregate exogenous variable respectively. System 6 is 
estimated with the cyclical component of real private GNP as the dependent variable and the 
identified residuals from the VAR with the Divisia MZM monetary aggregate
4
. System ML is 
estimated with the growth rate of real private GNP as the dependent variable with fiscal 
policy shocks identified from a support vector regression model. 
The estimated coefficients and the reported p-values of the contemporaneous and lagged 
fiscal policy shocks provide evidence on the significance and magnitude of the multipliers of 
the various fiscal shocks on the level and growth rate of real GNP. In the lower part of Table 
                                                             
4
 Again, the relevant estimates with identified fiscal policy shocks from the VAR with the simple sum 
MZM monetary aggregate as the exogenous variable are not included here as they are qualitatively 
exactly the same as the ones of system 5. They are available of course from the authors upon request. 
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5 we report the tail areas of the F-tests performed in testing for fiscal policy asymmetries. In 
this specification with contemporaneous and four lagged fiscal shocks we are able to perform 
the following tests: First, we test the null hypothesis that the coefficient of a contemporaneous 
positive government spending shock is equal to the coefficient of a contemporaneous negative 
government spending shock (          ) or in other words that an expansionary 
government spending shock has a symmetric effect on output as an equal contractionary 
government spending shock. In a similar manner, we test for symmetric effects of the 
expansionary and contractionary government revenue shocks with the null hypothesis 
(          ). Next, we test whether equivalent in terms of their impact on government 
deficit fiscal policies have asymmetric effects on the growth rate of real private GNP and its 
cyclical component. First, policies that increase the deficit, i.e. positive government spending 
and negative government revenue shocks (           ) and second, shocks that lead to 
fiscal consolidation, a decrease in government spending and an increase in government 
revenue  (           ).  
Moreover, we perform F-tests that all lagged coefficients of the unanticipated fiscal 
policy shocks are jointly equal to zero:                                  . 
Finally, in the last two rows of Table 5 we test for asymmetric cumulative effects of 
contractionary and expansionary unanticipated fiscal policy shocks:  
                                                     
                 
 Table 5 summarizes the regressions results and the hypotheses testing evidence. 
According to these, the estimated coefficients of all unanticipated fiscal policy shocks that are 
statistically significant appear to have the correct sign. In System 2 where the dependent 
variable is the growth rate of real private GNP, no shock appears statistically significant. In 
System 4 with the same dependent variable but shocks identified from a VAR using the 
Divisia MZM as the exogenous monetary aggregate variable only the contemporaneous 
unexpected negative government spending shock appears statistically significant with a 
coefficient of 0.310 and a p-value of 0.075. In System 6 where the dependent variable is now 
the cyclical component of real private GNP, three types of unanticipated government shocks 
are significant: the contemporaneous positive and negative government spending with 
coefficients 0.237 and 0.423 respectively and the second lag of the positive government 
revenue shock with a coefficient of -0.161. the p-values of these estimates are 0.095, 0.012 
and 0.031 respectively. In system ML, three types of unanticipated government shocks are 
significant: the third lag of the positive and the negative government spending shock and the 
third lag of the negative government revenue shock. Only the third lag of the positive 
government shock has the expected sign. The other two shocks have the opposite sign as 
expected from the theory. From these latter results it seems that both positive and negative 
government spending shocks have a positive impact, after three quarters, on the private real 
GNP. On the other hand, an unexpected reduction in government revenues will has a negative 
impact on the real private GNP in a three quarters period.  
In the lower part of Table 5 we report the results of the F-tests discussed above. We 
find evidence of unanticipated fiscal shock asymmetries in three cases in System 6 and in 
system ML. In system 6, where the dependent variable is the cyclical component of real 
private GNP the three reported asymmetries are: a) asymmetry in the type of contractionary 
policy as negative government spending shocks appear to have a significant impact on the 
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cycle of real private GNP while positive government revenue shocks appear statistically 
insignificant and the p-value of the test of equality between the two is 0.038; b) the joint test 
that all contemporaneous and lagged negative unanticipated government spending shocks 
appears statistically significant with p-value 0.094 while the positive joint government 
spending shock appears statistically insignificant; c) the joint test that all contemporaneous 
and lagged positive unanticipated government revenue shocks appears statistically significant 
with p-value 0.031 while the negative joint government revenue shock appears statistically 
insignificant. According to these results, only a contractionary unanticipated fiscal policy will 
have an impact on the cyclical component of GNP either through decreased government 
spending or increased government revenue. The joint impact of expansionary fiscal shocks 
appears statistically insignificant. In the last four rows of Table 5 we perform F-tests of 
equality between the cumulative effects of unanticipated fiscal policy shocks. We cannot 
reject any of these hypotheses. 
In system ML, in which the dependent variable is the growth rate of the real private 
GNP there is an asymmetry in the expansionary fiscal policy, where the positive government 
spending shock has a greater impact on GNP than the negative government revenue shock. 
Moreover, the test that the impact of all contemporaneous and lagged negative unanticipated 
government revenue shocks is statistically different than the impact of all contemporaneous 
and lagged positive unanticipated government revenue shocks.  
6. Conclusions 
 The aim of this paper was to empirically test the effects of fiscal policy shocks on the 
level and growth rate of real output and reveal possible asymmetries in fiscal policy 
implementation.  The data are quarterly over the period 1967:1 to 2011:4. In doing so, we 
used two alternative vector autoregressive systems as well as a support vector regression 
model in order to construct the fiscal policy shocks. These systems differ in the monetary 
aggregate used as one of the exogenous variables: a simple sum MZM and a CFS Divisia 
MZM. From each one of these systems we extracted four types of shocks: a negative and a 
positive government spending shock and a negative and a positive government revenue shock. 
These eight sets of unanticipated fiscal shocks were used next to empirically examine their 
effects on the level and growth rate of real private GNP in two sets of regressions: one that 
assumes only contemporaneous effects of the shocks on output and one that is augmented 
with four lags of each fiscal shock. Our results are summarized as follows: 
In the regressions with no lagged shocks we detect some asymmetries across the three 
systems that extracted errors from the VARs used, with respect to fiscal policy shocks. When 
the dependent variable is the growth rate of real private GNP expansionary and contractionary 
unanticipated fiscal policies have asymmetric effects: the expansionary fiscal policy through 
either a positive unanticipated government spending shock (SGP) or a negative unanticipated 
government revenue shock (SRN) is statistically significant with p-values of 0.008 and 0.052 
respectively while a contractionary fiscal policy through either a negative unanticipated 
government spending shock (SGN) or a positive unanticipated government revenue shock 
(SRP) is not significant. When the dependent variable is the cyclical component of real 
private GNP it appears that only a positive unanticipated government revenue shock has some 
impact on the cycle. We find that in general, expansionary unanticipated fiscal policy shocks 
have asymmetric effects and appear to affect real private output more than contractionary 
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fiscal shocks as the later appear insignificant. Expansionary fiscal policy is significant either 
through spending or revenue even though the coefficient of the positive government spending 
shock is more than three times larger than the coefficient of the negative government revenue 
shock in the systems with growth rate of GNP as the dependent variable and more than two 
times larger in the when the dependent variable is the GNP cyclical component. 
 Finally, in the systems with lags, only the contemporaneous unexpected negative 
government spending shock appears statistically significant in System 4. In System 6, where 
the dependent variable is now the cyclical component of real private GNP, three types of 
unanticipated shocks are significant: the contemporaneous positive and negative government 
spending and the second lag of the positive government revenue shock. In system ML, the 
third lags of the unanticipated positive and negative government spending shocks and the 
third lag od the negative government spending shock are statistically significant, whereas only 
the positive government spending shock has the sign as it is expected by the theory.  
In these systems, we find evidence of asymmetries in five cases and when the dependent 
variable is the cyclical component of real private GNP or the growth rate of the real private 
GNP: a) asymmetry in the type of contractionary policy (negative government spending 
shocks have a significant impact on the cycle of real private GNP while positive government 
revenue shocks appear statistically insignificant) b) the joint test that all contemporaneous and 
lagged negative unanticipated government spending shocks appears statistically significant 
while the positive joint government spending shock appears statistically insignificant c) the 
joint test that all contemporaneous and lagged positive unanticipated government revenue 
shocks appears statistically significant while the negative joint government revenue shocks 
appear statistically insignificant d) the positive government spending shock has a greater 
impact on GNP than the negative government revenue shock and e) the impact of all 
contemporaneous and lagged negative unanticipated government revenue shocks is 
statistically different than the impact of all contemporaneous and lagged positive 
unanticipated government revenue shocks. 
Finally, the use of the support vector regression method did not gave to our results any extra 
explanatory power than the classical Blanchard and Perotti method. 
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Table 1. Unit Root Tests 
      
 
A. ADF Test 
 
B. KPSS Test 
 
C. Elliott et al. Test 
  Variable Level   1st Diff.   Level   1st Diff.  Level   1st Diff.   Decision 
 
Null Hypothesis: I(1) 
 
Null Hypothesis: I(0) 
 
Null Hypothesis: I(1) 
  
 
Probability margin 
 
LM-Stat 
 
Test statistic 
  
Endogenous Variables: Real Variables                    
        r 0.799 
 
0.000 *** 0.211 ** 0.036 
 
20.609 
 
1.635 *** I(1) 
g 0.745 
 
0.000 *** 0.122 * 0.081 
 
24.006 
 
1.336 *** I(1) 
y 0.114 
 
0.000 *** 0.113 
 
0.044 
 
4.350 * 1.352 *** I(1) 
              Exogenous Variables: Monetary Variables                 
              Simple Sum 
MZM 0.856 
 
0.000 *** 0.205 ** 0.114 
 
14.708 
 
1.331 *** I(1) 
CFS Divisia 
MZM 0.038 ** 0.014 ** 0.087 
 
0.060 
 
1.473 *** 3.445 *** I(1) 
TB3 0.323 
 
0.000 *** 0.224 *** 0.028 
 
13.186 
 
1.260 *** I(1) 
                         
The  tests are done with an intercept and a trend. 
        *, ** or ***, denote denote a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 10%, 5% or 1% level. 
   The 10%, 5% and 1% critical values for the KPSS tests are 0.119, 0.146 and 0.216 respectively.
  The 10%, 5% and 1% critical values for the Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock tests are 6.845, 5.656 and 4.094 respectively. 
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Table 2. Systems Employed in Fiscal Policy Shock Extraction 
  Dependent Variable 
 
Exogenous Variables 
 
r g y 
 
TB3 
Simple 
Sum MZM 
Divisia 
MZM 
Lags 
VAR 1            
 
       
 
4 
VAR 2                         4 
 
 
Table 3. Johansen Maximum Likelihood Cointegration Tests 
   
Endogenous Exogenous 
VAR 
Lags 
Normality 
J-B joint 
test 
Serial  
Correlation 
LM test 
Null 
Hypothesis 
      
       
Coint. 
Vectors 
           r, g, y TB3 4 0.000 0.240 r = 0 0.008 *** 0.025 ** 1 
 
Sum MZM 
   
r <= 1 0.122 
 
0.305 
  
     
r <= 2 0.045 ** 0.045 ** 
 
           r, g, y TB3 4 0.000 0.288 r = 0 0.001 *** 0.013 ** 1 
 
Divisia MZM 
   
r <= 1 0.019 ** 0.215 
            r <= 2 0.004 *** 0.004 ***   
One, two and three asteriscs denote rejection of the null hypotheis at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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   Table 4. Fiscal Policy Shocks on the Level of Real Private GNP 
 
System 1 
 
System 3 
 
System 5 
 
System ML 
  Coefficient p-value  Coefficient p-value  Coef. prob. 
 
Coef. prob.  
C 0.002 0.219 
 
0.002 0.266 
 
-0.001 0.303 
 
0.000 0.8425  
d(y(-1)) 0.214 0.004 *** 0.206 0.020 ** 1.101 0.000 *** 0.191 0.0284 ** 
d(y(-2)) 0.155 0.027 ** 0.136 0.030 ** -0.274 0.003 *** 0.131 0.0634 * 
d(TB3) 0.002 0.004 *** 0.002 0.058 * 0.003 0.026 ** 0.002 0.0375 ** 
d(MZM) 0.118 0.002 *** 0.197 0.001 *** 0.080 0.172 
 
0.205 0.0026 *** 
SGP 0.406 0.008 *** 0.364 0.077 * 0.138 0.412 
 
179.82 0.3329  
SGN 0.217 0.113 
 
0.226 0.226 
 
0.436 0.012 
 
-68.69 0.7095  
SRP -0.102 0.166 
 
-0.123 0.194 
 
-0.124 0.061 * 17.76 0.6951  
SRN -0.124 0.052 * -0.119 0.087 * -0.067 0.295 
 
13.028 0.7319  
          
   
F-Tests 
         
   
SGP=SGN 
 
0.444
  
0.690
  
0.313
 
 -  
SRP=SRN 
 
0.848 
  
0.979 
  
0.566 
 
 -  
SGP=SRN 
 
0.088 * 
 
0.256 
  
0.677 
 
 -  
SGN=SRP   0.460     0.578    0.109   -  
Note: *, ** and ***, denote a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels 
respectively 
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Table 5.  Fiscal Policy Shocks on  Real Private GNP using Four Lags 
 
System 2 
 
System 4 
 
System 6 
 
System ML 
  Coef. prob.  Coef. prob.  Coef. prob.  Coef. prob.  
C 0.000 0.953 
 
0.001 0.668 
 
-0.003 0.124 
 
0.003 0.65  
d(y((-1)) 0.265 0.003 *** 0.240 0.010 ** 0.943 0.000 *** 0.162 0.06 * 
d(y((-2)) 0.203 0.019 ** 0.195 0.032 ** 0.020 0.873 
 
0.168 0.03 ** 
d(y((-3)) 0.050 0.577 
 
0.029 0.730 
 
-0.146 0.132 
 
-0.106 0.13  
d(y((-4)) -0.008 0.922 
 
-0.016 0.845 
 
-0.045 0.560 
 
-0.005 0.94  
d(TB3) 0.001 0.428 
 
0.001 0.272 
 
0.002 0.075 * 0.001 0.17  
d(TB3(-1)) 0.001 0.420 
 
0.002 0.077 * 0.003 0.017 ** -0.000 0.52  
d(TB3(-2)) 0.000 0.957 
 
0.001 0.551 
 
0.002 0.028 ** 0.001 0.40  
d(TB3(-3)) 0.001 0.725 
 
0.000 0.800 
 
0.003 0.017 ** 0.000 0.92  
d(TB3(-4)) -0.003 0.010 ** -0.003 0.000 *** -0.001 0.235 
 
-0.002 0.00 ** 
d(mzm) 0.081 0.138 
 
0.232 0.032 ** 0.123 0.305 
 
0.099 0.24  
d(mzm(-1)) 0.126 0.032 ** 0.233 0.032 ** 0.228 0.011 ** 0.175 0.05 * 
d(mzm(-2)) -0.012 0.858 
 
-0.035 0.727 
 
0.036 0.695 
 
0.071 0.42  
d(mzm(-3)) -0.039 0.662 
 
-0.199 0.074 * -0.093 0.286 
 
-0.193 0.01 ** 
d(mzm(-4)) -0.004 0.937 
 
-0.007 0.917 
 
-0.080 0.164 
 
0.004 0.94  
SGP 0.296 0.214 
 
0.275 0.210 
 
0.237 0.095 * -67.38 0.73  
SGP(-1) 0.015 0.921 
 
0.077 0.633 
 
0.052 0.709 
 
135.88 0.35  
SGP(-2) -0.120 0.370 
 
-0.044 0.761 
 
-0.166 0.156 
 
-90.03 0.55  
SGP(-3) -0.257 0.151 
 
-0.213 0.199 
 
-0.136 0.290 
 
475.36 0.01 ** 
SGP(-4) -0.115 0.431 
 
-0.173 0.262 
 
-0.118 0.326 
 
-233.30 0.23  
SGN 0.273 0.165 
 
0.310 0.075 * 0.423 0.012 ** 81.66 0.68  
SGN(-1) -0.180 0.283 
 
-0.131 0.419 
 
-0.149 0.283 
 
100.56 0.48  
SGN(-2) -0.052 0.690 
 
-0.063 0.606 
 
0.043 0.754 
 
48.03 0.77  
SGN(-3) -0.204 0.184 
 
-0.193 0.204 
 
0.046 0.705 
 
-515.04 0.01 ** 
SGN(-4) 0.118 0.425 
 
0.145 0.334 
 
0.222 0.173 
 
216.79 0.29  
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Table 5 (continued).  Fiscal Policy Shocks on  Real Private GNP using Four Lags 
SRP -0.073 0.461 
 
-0.097 0.345 
 
-0.064 0.273 
 
20.0 0.61  
SRP(-1) 0.135 0.123 
 
0.116 0.167 
 
-0.065 0.344 
 
26.2 0.35  
SRP(-2) 0.076 0.373 
 
0.057 0.493 
 
-0.161 0.031 ** -4.32 0.90  
SRP(-3) -0.054 0.420 
 
-0.048 0.459 
 
-0.069 0.168 
 
26.11 0.48  
SRP(-4) 0.056 0.455 
 
0.057 0.416 
 
0.075 0.308 
 
-12.77 0.73  
SRN -0.161 0.071 
 
-0.187 0.011 
 
-0.206 0.001 
 
-5.66 0.87  
SRN(-1) -0.030 0.710 
 
-0.024 0.738 
 
0.045 0.610 
 
-25.98 0.37  
SRN(-2) 0.017 0.788 
 
0.058 0.309 
 
0.112 0.070 
 
5.84 0.88  
SRN(-3) 0.049 0.464 
 
0.064 0.315 
 
0.070 0.214 
 
104.03 0.00 *** 
SRN(-4) 0.020 0.721 
 
0.020 0.724 
 
-0.015 0.723 
 
18.34 0.55  
          
   
 
System 2 
 
System 4 
 
System 6 
 
System ML  
F-Tests 
         
   
SGP=SGN 
 
0.951
  
0.923
  
0.478
 
 0.652  
SRP=SRN 
 
0.578 
  
0.530 
  
0.118 
 
 -  
SGP=SRN 
 
0.590 
  
0.701 
  
0.840 
 
 0.005 *** 
SGN=SRP 
 
0.293 
  
0.227 
  
0.038 **  -  
joint SGP=0 
 
0.686 
  
0.843 
  
0.638 
 
 0.632  
joint SGN=0 
 
0.896 
  
0.807 
  
0.094 *  0.855  
joint SRP=0 
 
0.376 
  
0.585 
  
0.031 **  0.507  
joint SRN=0 
 
0.574 
  
0.656 
  
0.968 
 
 0.289  
Σ SGP = Σ SGN 
 
0.841 
  
0.799 
  
0.179 
 
 0.441  
Σ SRP = Σ SRN 
 
0.348 
  
0.495 
  
0.161 
 
 0.000 *** 
Σ SGP = Σ SRN 
 
0.628 
  
0.768 
  
0.676 
 
 0.509  
Σ SGN = Σ SRP   0.748    0.561    0.437   0.975  
Note: *, ** and ***, denote a rejection of the null hypothesis at the 0.10, 0.05 
and 0.01 levels respectively 
   
 
